What Does Nozicks Experience Machine Argument Really Prove? :: Philosophy Philosophical Papers

What Does Nozicks get a line Machine Argument Re solelyy Prove? uprise Nozicks long-familiar Experience Machine transmission line can be considered a typic totallyy successful literary argument as remote as I know, it has non been discussed much and has been widely seen as conclusive, or at least(prenominal) convert enough to confound the rational- domain versions of utilitarianism. I call up that if his argument were conclusive, its cataclysmic opinion would be even significanter. It would not however refute genial- farming utilitarianism, merely all theories (whether utilitarian or not) considering a trustworthy inborn mental state (happiness, pleasure, desire, satisfaction) as the only important state. I shall call these theories mental state welfarist theories. I do not know whether utilitarianism or, in general, mental-state welfarism is plausible, besides I doubt that Nozicks argument is strong enough to give that it is not. INozicks well-known Experience Mac hine argument can be considered as a typically successful argument as far as I know, it has not been very discussed and has been widely seen as conclusive, or at least convincing enough to refute the mental-state versions of Utilitarianism. (1) Indeed, I believe that if his argument were conclusive, its destructive effect would be even stronger. It would not only refute mental-state utilitarianism, but all theories (whether utilitarian or not) considering a certain subjective mental state (happiness, pleasure, desire satisfaction) as the only valuable state. I shall call these theories mental state welfarist theories. (2)I do not know whether utilitarianism or, in general, mental-state welfarism is plausible. But I doubt that Nozicks argument is strong enough to prove that it is not.This note tries to explain my doubts. Let us make by briefly recalling the argumentSuppose there were an fuck off weapon that would give you any experience you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists c ould stimulate your brain so that you would hypothesise and feel you were writing a great novel, or fashioning a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain. Should you plug into this machine for keep, preprogramming your life experiences? ... Of course, succession in the tank you wont know that youre there youll think that its all very happening ... Would you plug in?. (3)IIAccording to a first interpretation of Nozicks argument, it proves (or attempts to prove) that we have strong reasons not to plug into the Machine. such(prenominal) reasons could not be accepted by mental state Welfarism.What Does Nozicks Experience Machine Argument Really Prove? Philosophy Philosophical text fileWhat Does Nozicks Experience Machine Argument Really Prove?ABSTRACT Nozicks well-known Experience Machine argument can be considered a typically successful argument as far as I know, it has not been discussed muc h and has been widely seen as conclusive, or at least convincing enough to refute the mental-state versions of utilitarianism. I believe that if his argument were conclusive, its destructive effect would be even stronger. It would not only refute mental-state utilitarianism, but all theories (whether utilitarian or not) considering a certain subjective mental state (happiness, pleasure, desire, satisfaction) as the only valuable state. I shall call these theories mental state welfarist theories. I do not know whether utilitarianism or, in general, mental-state welfarism is plausible, but I doubt that Nozicks argument is strong enough to prove that it is not. INozicks well-known Experience Machine argument can be considered as a typically successful argument as far as I know, it has not been very discussed and has been widely seen as conclusive, or at least convincing enough to refute the mental-state versions of Utilitarianism. (1) Indeed, I believe that if his argument were conclus ive, its destructive effect would be even stronger. It would not only refute mental-state utilitarianism, but all theories (whether utilitarian or not) considering a certain subjective mental state (happiness, pleasure, desire satisfaction) as the only valuable state. I shall call these theories mental state welfarist theories. (2)I do not know whether utilitarianism or, in general, mental-state welfarism is plausible. But I doubt that Nozicks argument is strong enough to prove that it is not.This note tries to explain my doubts. Let us begin by briefly recalling the argumentSuppose there were an experience machine that would give you any experience you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you were writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain. Should you plug into this machine for life, preprogramming your li fe experiences? ... Of course, while in the tank you wont know that youre there youll think that its all actually happening ... Would you plug in?. (3)IIAccording to a first interpretation of Nozicks argument, it proves (or attempts to prove) that we have strong reasons not to plug into the Machine. Such reasons could not be accepted by mental state Welfarism.